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Abstract
Can one teach entrepreneurship, or is it a fixed personal characteristic? Most academic and policy
discussion on microentrepreneurs in developing countries focuses on their access to credit, and
assumes their human capital to be fixed. However, a growing number of microfinance organizations
are attempting to build the human capital of micro-entrepreneurs in order to improve the livelihood
of their clients and help further their mission of poverty alleviation. Using a randomized control
trial, we measure the marginal impact of adding business training to a Peruvian village banking
program for female microentrepreneurs.  Treatment groups received thirty to sixty minute
entrepreneurship training sessions during their normal weekly or monthly banking meeting over a
period of one to two years. Control groups remained as they were before, meeting at the same
frequency but solely for making loan and savings payments. We find that the treatment led to
improved business knowledge, practices and revenues. The microfinance institution also had direct
benefits through higher repayment and client retention rates. Larger effects found for those that
expressed less interest in training in a baseline survey have important implications for implementing
similar market-based
interventions with a goal of recovering costs.
Keywords:  entrepreneurship, microfinance, business training, business skills, adult education
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I.  Introduction 
 
  Can one teach entrepreneurship?  Both macro growth models as well as micro market 
models often include human capital as a critical component.  However, many of our models of 
entrepreneurial activity in developing countries treat human capital as fixed, and focus instead 
on financial constraints and information asymmetries in credit and equity markets (Banerjee and 
Newman 1993; Paulson and Townsend 2004).  Similarly, much of the microfinance industry 
focuses on the infusion of financial capital into micro-enterprises, not human capital, as if the 
entrepreneurs either already have the necessary human capital.  Some development 
practitioners, however, actively pursue strategies to teach adults (typically women) 
entrepreneurial skills.  These programs are strikingly heterogeneous, and little is known about 
their impact on economic outcomes for the poor. 
  In this paper, we evaluate the marginal impact of adding entrepreneurship training to a 
microfinance program in Peru.  Much tension exists in the development finance community 
regarding whether lenders should specialize on financial services only, or should integrate non-
financial services into their programs (MkNelly, Watetip, Lassen and Dunford 1996).
1  The idea 
that specialization is good is certainly not new, but in this setting it is unknown whether the 
economies of scope outweigh the risks of having credit officers simultaneously become 
“teachers.”  The issue is starker in other “education” components such as health and nutrition 
training.  Such other modules are often part of the “credit with education” approach, but this 
study focuses strictly on the business training modules.  Aside from losing focus on the lending 
                                                 
1 In a third alternative, the “parallel” approach, non-financial services are provided to the same 
individuals by another organization (or other employees of the same organization) in coordination with 
the financial service provider.   2
and savings activities, providing detailed business advice may lead to higher default if the 
borrower then perceives the lender as partially responsible for any business changes that do not 
succeed. 
  Similar entrepreneurship training has been used around the world by Freedom from 
Hunger (FFH), a US-based non-profit organization, as well as other organizations.  FFH is 
considered the leader in the “credit with education” integrated model of microfinance and is 
directly responsible for work in 18 countries and over 30 financial institutions.  Its influence in 
credit-linked training programs is evident from the adoption of its approach by other 
organizations without direct intervention from FFH and its prominent role at industry events 
such as the Microcredit Summit (Dunford 2002).  However, little is known about the marginal 
impact of these non-financial services.
2  This study addresses this gap by implementing a 
randomized control trial to assess the marginal impact of incorporating such training into a 
microcredit program.  The study was conducted with the Foundation for International 
Community Assistance (FINCA) in Peru, a “village banking” organization for poor, female 
microentrepreneurs in Lima and Ayacucho.  We randomly assigned pre-existing lending groups 
to either treatment or control.  Treatment groups received the training as part of their mandatory 
weekly meetings.  Control groups remained as they were before, a credit and savings only 
group.  We conducted a baseline survey before the intervention and a follow-up survey between 
one and two years later. 
                                                 
2 One notable exception is an analysis of the non-credit services offered by the microfinance institutions 
in Bangladesh.  This study used a structural approach to estimate the impact of credit services and 
assumed the residual impact to be due to the non-credit aspect of the program (McKernan 2002).  Prior 
evaluations of Freedom from Hunger have measured the impact of the entire package of credit with 
education versus no services, not the marginal value of the education to the credit program.  A 
comparison has been done on Project HOPE’s credit program with health education versus the credit 
program alone (Smith 2002).  This study did not focus on specifically entrepreneurial training and was 
not a randomized control trial.     3
  We find strong benefits for both the client and the microfinance institution.  The client 
shows improved business processes and knowledge and increased sales.  The microfinance 
institution benefits from increased retention and repayment.  Section II presents the nature of the 
intervention and basic hypothesis.  Section III explains the experimental design and Section IV 
details the data collected and empirical strategy.  Section V presents the results, and Section VI 
concludes. 
II.  The intervention and its expected effects 
 
  The goal of the business training intervention is two-fold: to improve business outcomes 
and overall welfare for clients and to improve institutional outcomes for the microfinance 
institution.  Stronger business may demand more services, and clients may be less likely to 
default if they are satisfied (either due to higher cash flow or a stronger feeling of reciprocity).  
But the two goals do not need to reinforce each other.  If business increases enough that clients 
“graduate” to larger formal sector banks, providing the business training could lead to lower 
client retention for this organization. 
The Intervention 
  FINCA is a small, non-profit, but financially sustainable, microfinance institution (MFI) 
that has been operating in Peru since 1993, and is associated with FINCA International, a large 
US-based, non-profit organization responsible for creating and replicating the village banking 
methodology around the world.  FINCA-Peru’s mission is to improve the socio-economic 
situation of the poor and empower women through the promotion of the village-banking 
methodology.  By providing them with working capital to increase inventory and invest in their 
businesses, FINCA expects to increase the earned income of its clients, primarily poor women   4
with no collateral.  In addition to providing credit, FINCA teaches its clients to save by 
requiring weekly or monthly savings deposits that correspond to the size of the loan the client 
has taken out and by encouraging additional voluntary savings for which they receive market 
interest rates.  FINCA further aims to empower clients by giving them the opportunity to run 
their banks through their rotating participation on the village-bank board. 
  FINCA has operations in three particularly poor districts of Lima, and in two Andean 
provinces, Ayacucho and Huancavelica.  As of June 2003, FINCA sponsored 273 village banks 
with a total of 6,429 clients, 96 percent of which were women.  FINCA members, particularly 
those in Ayacucho, are relatively young and have little formal education.  FINCA clients each 
hold, on average, $233 in savings whereas the average loan is $203, with a recovery rate of 99 
percent.  FINCA charges sufficient interest to be self-sustainable.  Its sustainability indicator 
(Total income / Total expenses) was 99 percent in 1998; 105.5 percent in 1999; and 132.2 
percent in August, 2000. 
  The business training materials were developed through a collaborative effort between 
FINCA, Atinchik,
3 and Freedom from Hunger (FFH), and had been used in the past in other 
projects.
4  The program included general business skills and strategy training, not client-specific 
problem-solving.  Although the pedagogy did include discussion with the clients (not just 
lecture) and various short exercises, there was no part of the program that worked directly with 
                                                 
3 Atinchik, a nine-year old firm, specializes in the generation of training materials in business 
management for micro-entrepreneurs.  Atinchik had used similar training previously in a project for the 
World Bank.  
4 Since 1995, FFH has provided technical assistance to eighteen MFIs in Asia, Africa and Latin America, 
with its program Credit with Education, a combination of microcredit and educational services.  Working 
with independent local partners, FFH provides training in microfinance products, MFI capacity building, 
and adult education in health and business development.  Its business education curriculum was 
developed through market assessments using individual surveys, focus groups with key informants, pilot-
testing, and the feedback of clients and staff.   5
an individual client on their individual business problems.  Although the content of the training 
was similar in both locations, they were organized and presented differently to cater to the 
differences in educational levels and learning processes.
5  In Lima, clients received handouts 
and did homework, whereas in Ayacucho, teaching relied more heavily on visual aids and was 
sometimes in Quechua.  The training materials in Lima were organized in two modules.  The 
first module introduced attendees to what a business is, how a business works, and the 
marketplace.  Clients were taught to identify their customers, competitors, and the position of 
the business in the marketplace and then learned about product, promotional strategies and 
commercial planning.  The second module explained how to separate business and home 
finances by establishing the differences between income, costs, and profit, teaching how to 
calculate production costs, and product pricing.  See Appendix A for more details on the content 
of the business training. 
  Training began in October, 2002 in Lima and in March, 2003 in Ayacucho and was 
planned to last 22 weekly sessions in total.  Each bank timed the beginning of the training with 
the beginning of new loan cycles, so not all banks began training at the same time.  Ayacucho’s 
meetings are weekly, whereas in Lima some groups meet weekly and others meet bi-weekly. 
The Intended Effects 
  The goal of the program is to teach entrepreneurial skills.  However, if the entrepreneurial 
“spirit” is a fixed characteristic, teaching an individual to engage in activities similar to a 
successful entrepreneur may not actually lead to improved business outcomes.  The training 
aims to improve basic business practices such as how to treat clients, how to use profits, where 
                                                 
5 Among FINCA’s Lima clients, the literacy rate is 98 percent, the majority has a secondary education 
and 40 percent have some post-secondary schooling as well.  On the other hand, in the Ayacucho region, 
almost 70 percent of the FINCA clients did not finish secondary school and approximately 15 percent are 
illiterate.   6
to sell, the use of special discounts, credit sales, and the goods and services produced.  These 
improvements should lead to more sales, more workers, and could eventually provide incentives 
to join the formal sector.  
  We also examine the impact on two sets of household outcomes: household decision-
making and child labor.  The link to household decision-making is straightforward and one of 
the oft-cited motivations of such training: improved business success could empower female 
microentrepreneurs with respect to their husbands/partners in business and family decisions by 
giving them more control of their finances.  Measuring child labor effects is also important, 
since children in these households are often actively involved in the family enterprise.  Any 
change to the household enterprise may have important effects on child labor and education, 
although the expected impact is ambiguous.  The training may increase or decrease the marginal 
product of labor, hence could increase or decrease child labor through a substitution effect.  If 
the training increases business income, then this would lead to an expected decrease in child 
labor and increase in schooling as wealth increases.
6  Furthermore, an indirect effect may occur 
in which the education (if valued by the mother) motivates the mother to invest more in 
schooling of her children. 
   In addition to impact on the client´s business and her household, the training could 
impact important outcomes for the institution.  If clients’ businesses improve, they are more able 
to repay their loans.  The training also may engender goodwill and sentiments of reciprocity, 
also leading to higher repayment rates.  Loan sizes and savings volumes are more ambiguous: if 
clients learn how to manage their cash flows better, they perhaps will need less debt.  On the 
                                                 
6 The connection between increased income and the reduction of child labor and the increments in 
schooling can be reviewed in Basu and Van (1998), Baland and Robinson (2000), and Edmonds (2005; 
2006), among others.    7
other hand, the business training may lead them to expand their business, and thus also demand 
more financial capital.   
  Although much of the academic literature focuses on repayment rates for microfinance, 
many institutions (who typically have near perfect repayment) are more concerned with client 
retention (Copestake 2002).  The expected effects here are ambiguous.  If clients like the 
training, they may be more likely to remain in the program in order to receive the training, 
whereas obviously if they do not like the training (perhaps due to the additional 30-60 minutes 
per week required for the village bank meetings), they may be more likely to leave.  The net 
effect is critical for the microfinance institution, since maintaining a stable client base is 
important for the sustainability of the organization. 
III.  The experimental design and the monitoring of the intervention  
 
  We evaluate the effectiveness of integrating business training with microfinance services 
using a randomized-control trial in which pre-existing lending groups were assigned randomly 
to control and treatment groups.  In Ayacucho, of the 140 village banks (3,265 clients), 55 were 
assigned to a mandatory treatment group (clients had to stay through the training at their weekly 
bank meeting
7), 34 were assigned to a voluntary treatment group (clients were allowed to leave 
after their loan payment was made, before the training began), and 51 were assigned to a control 
group which received no additional services beyond the credit and savings program.  In Lima, of 
99 FINCA-sponsored banks (1,326 clients), 49 were assigned to mandatory treatment and 50 
were assigned to control (there was no “voluntary’ treatment group in Lima).  The 
                                                 
7 Fines were applied for absence or tardiness, and could result in expulsion from the bank.   8
randomization was stratified by credit officer; hence each credit officer has the same proportion 
of treatment and control groups. 
  We monitored the attendance at the weekly meetings and the training sessions.  On 
average, training sessions in mandatory training banks had an 88% attendance rate while 
attendance in voluntary banks was 76%.
8  The training did not occur at each meeting (nor does it 
typically under most implementations of “credit with education”).  First, some treatment banks 
put the trainings on hold if they were having problems such as high default and drop out rates.  
In these cases, they would often enter a restructuring phase that involved reinforcement of the 
traditional FINCA training about good repayment practices and discipline.  The training session 
was also skipped at the first and last meeting of each cycle, and when the meeting included a 
group activity such as the celebration of a birthday or regional and religious holidays.  In these 
cases, the session would be postponed until the following meeting.  There were other cases in 
which the clients and credit officers decided that they needed more time to grasp fully the 
information offered in one session.  In some cases, it became a normal practice for banks to 
agree to spend an extra meeting reviewing the material of the previous training session.
9 
  These practices not only delayed the completion of the training materials, but also caused 
heterogeneity in treatment intensity across groups.  In Lima, for example, the average bank 
advanced 3.5 sessions per loan cycle over the 12-meeting cycles.  However, it was common for 
banks to complete five training sessions in the first loan cycle, and slow to an average of 2.6 
training sessions per cycle over time.  As a result, after at least 24 months since the launch of the 
                                                 
8 Attendance in voluntary banks gradually slowed from an average of 80% at the beginning to 70% in the 
last two cycles observed. 
9 In the case of Lima, such revisions often implied using the sessions to work in groups, with the support 
from the credit officer, on the assigned homework.   9
training, only half the banks had reached the 17
th session out of a total of 22 programmed 
sessions.  The empirical analysis will compare the village banks assigned to treatment to those 
assigned to control, irrespective of how well they adhered to the training program, and 
irrespective of how well clients attended the training.  This is important not only to avoid a 
selection bias, but also because the delays experienced here are normal for credit with education 
interventions.
10  Had the training been adhered to more strictly, we would be estimating the 
impact of a treatment that is stronger than is normally implemented. 
IV.  Data and estimation methods 
  This evaluation uses three key data sources: FINCA financial-transaction data, a baseline 
survey before the randomization results were announced, and a follow-up survey up to two 
years later. 
  Financial-transaction data are from FINCA’s database, which contains the reports of all 
the transactions made by each bank client at every scheduled meeting since 1999.  It includes 
information on the loan cycles, broken down by loan payment, interest, mandatory and 
voluntary savings, fines for tardiness, and contributions to cover default of other members.  The 
database also includes some socio-economic characteristics of the clients, such as age, 
education, and business main economic activity, registered when the client first joined a 
FINCA-sponsored village bank. 
  The baseline and follow-up surveys included a variety of questions on the socio-
demographic characteristics and other general information about the client’s household and 
business.  Outcomes can be divided into four categories: (1) institutional outcomes, (2) business 
                                                 
10 This stylized fact reported to us by Freedom from Hunger staff.   10
processes, knowledge and savings practices (i.e., testing whether the specific practices taught in 
the training were adopted), (3) business outcomes, (4) household outcomes, including 
empowerment in decision-making and child labor (the Lima follow-up survey included 
questions related to the time children between six and fifteen years old dedicate to domestic 
work and school activities).  The full list of outcome variables and their definitions are included 
in Appendix Table 1. 
  In treatment banks, the baseline survey was given within a few weeks prior to the bank 
beginning the training.  Figure 1 above shows the timeline of these components of the study for 
Ayacucho and Lima.  Most baseline surveys were completed at the FINCA office at the time of 
their weekly meeting, although due to time constraints some of them had to be completed at 
their home or place of business.  In Ayacucho, we completed baseline 3265 surveys, while in 
Lima, we completed 1326 baseline surveys. 
 
Figure 1: Timeline of the intervention and data collection 
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  Seventy-six percent of the clients in the baseline survey were reached and surveyed for the 
follow-up survey.  For the 62% of the clients interviewed in the baseline who were no longer 
members of a FINCA-sponsored village bank when the follow-up surveys began, we located   11
them using addresses collected in the baseline survey or, in some cases, asking neighbors or 
FINCA members.  However, some clients had moved far away, were impossible to locate, or 
refused to be interviewed.  In total, we interviewed 83% of the clients who were still borrowing 
from FINCA, and about 72% of those who had dropped from the program.  As Appendix Table 
2 shows, there was not a survey response bias in Ayacucho but in Lima control group 
individuals were slightly more likely to complete the survey.  This may be due to the training 
taking itself a long time, so individuals were less willing to spend the extra time to complete the 
survey.  Also, among those who dropped out, the response rate is higher for the control group 
than the treatment group. 
  Appendix Table 2 shows some key demographic characteristics and financial-transaction 
history of the members of control and treatment groups before BDS training began.  These 
results verify that the random assignment produced observably similar treatment and control 
groups.  At the time of the randomization, data were available on prior repayment rates, the 
average loan size and the average savings size.  The remaining variables were unobserved at the 
time of the randomization, but also are similar across treatment and control groups, as expected. 
  To estimate the impact of the business training program, we use the first-difference (FD) 
or the double-difference (DD) estimators, depending on whether we observe the outcome of 
interest only in the follow-up, or in both the baseline and follow-up survey.  The FD estimator is 
obtained by comparing the levels of the outcomes variables between the treatment and control 
groups.  In turn, the DD estimator is obtained from comparing changes over time in a particular 
outcome variable between treatment and control groups.  As long as the control and treatment 
groups were similar ex-ante, which was assured through the randomization, we can argue that   12
both estimators can provide an unbiased estimate of the impact of the intention to treat with 
business training program on a particular outcome variable. 
  Econometrically, the FD estimator is obtained by estimating the following linear 
regression: 
ij
T
j ij D Y ε β α + + =           ( 1 )  
where  ij Y  denotes an outcome variable for client i in bank j after the treatment, 
T
j D  is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one if the client belonged to a treatment bank, and  ij ε  denotes the 
error term which is assumed to be independent across banks but not necessarily within them.  
Thus,  β  measures the difference between the treatment and control groups in the outcome 
Y after the treatment, and is an unbiased estimate of the average impact of being assigned to a 
treatment group on the outcome variable Y . In the tables of results section, we also report 
estimates of β  that result from a regression that adds to eq. (1) a set of covariates such as the 
clients’ age and education, the number of loans received from FINCA, business type and size, 
and branch location.
11  
  We also test whether the training generates heterogeneous treatment effects along 
characteristics such as prior interest in training, schooling, marital status, and business size as 
measured by total revenues, the following model is then used: 
ij i
T
j
T
j i ij X D D X Y ε β β δ α + + + + = 0 2 1 0 ,        ( 2 )  
                                                 
11  Since treatment was assigned randomly, we would expect the insertion of these covariates to 
unbiasedly reduce the variance of the estimated effect.   13
where  0 X  is a binary variable that denotes the characteristic of interest prior to the intervention.  
In this case,  1 β  is the FD estimator for those individuals that have characteristic  0 = X  and 
( 2 1 β β + ) measures the impact for those individuals that have characteristic  1 = X . 
  If the outcome variable is a dummy variable, then we estimate a probit model and report 
the marginal effect of 
C
i D  for the impact of business training on outcome Y .  In the model with 
interactions, the marginal effect for those with  0 = X  is obtained by estimating 
() () [ ] 0 , 0 / 1 r P ˆ 0 , 1 / 1 r P ˆ = = = − = = = X D Y X D Y .  For those clients for whom  1 = X , the 
marginal effect of treatment on those clients with  1 = X  is obtained with the following 
expression:  () ( ) [ ] 1 , 0 / 1 r P ˆ 1 , 1 / 1 r P ˆ = = = − = = = X D Y X D Y . 
  The double difference estimator comes from the following expression: 
ijt
T
j t
T
jt t ijt D Post D Post Y ε β β β α + + + + = 3 2 1        ( 3 )  
where  t Post  is a binary variable equal to one if the observation corresponds to the post-
treatment time period.  Then,  3 β  is the double difference estimator of the program’s impact on 
outcome  Y .  As before, to measure whether treatment is heterogeneous across various 
characteristics, the following model is estimated: 
ijt i
T
j t
T
j t i j j i j j i ijt X D Post D Post X D D X D D X Y ε β β γ β γ β δ α + + + + + + + + = 0 4 3 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 (4) 
where  o X  is a binary variable that denotes the characteristic of interest at the time of the 
baseline.  In this case,  3 β  is the double difference estimator for those individuals that do not 
have characteristic  X  and ( 4 3 β β + ) measures the impact for those individuals that do have it.    14
V.  Results 
  We divide the analysis into four categories of outcome variables:  (1) institutional 
outcomes, (2) business processes and knowledge, (3) business outcomes, and (4) household 
outcomes including empowerment in decision-making and child labor.   
Institutional results 
  We found important effects of training on important institutional outcomes such as 
repayment and client retention.  Repayment among treatment groups is three percentage points 
higher than among control groups (Table 1).  That is, clients among treatment groups were more 
likely to maintain a clean repayment record in the cycles between the baseline and follow-up 
surveys.
12  We also found that treatment group clients were four to five percentage points less 
likely to dropout.  However, when not counting returnees as dropouts, this effect is slightly 
smaller and no longer statistically significant.  We infer from this that clients place high value 
on the training they receive, causing them to avoid at a minimum temporary exits, and perhaps 
permanent ones as well.  Still, treatment clients are more likely to cite the length of weekly 
meetings as a factor in dropping out of the program (Appendix Table 4).  So while in net the 
business training is good for client retention, the program can expect to lose some clients due to 
lengthier meetings.  Making the training voluntary would reduce in principle this tension, but we 
find the improvement in dropout rates is slightly higher for the mandatory treatment than the 
voluntary treatment groups (Table 1b). 
  Another explanation for the increase in client retention for treatment groups is the 
improvement of clients’ business outcomes, leading to higher repayment capability.  The 
                                                 
12 A client is said to have had a clean repayment record if their payments over the cycle plus their savings 
were always enough to cover the amount borrowed plus interest.    15
increase in client retention could be driven by the reduction in default rather than client 
satisfaction if the training causes some clients who might have defaulted to increase their ability 
to make loan payments, thus avoiding the need to drop out of the program for default.  This 
would require an increase in business income to provide the funds to make extra payments, and 
as we shall see below, such impacts were indeed detected.  We examine whether the treatment 
led to more dropout with default as well as dropout without default, and although the treatment 
effect is larger in reducing dropout without default, when disaggregated neither is significant 
statistically. 
  We also find that the improvement in repayment rates and client retention are strongest for 
clients with larger businesses (as measured by sales) and for those who expressed the least 
interest in business training in the baseline survey.
13  The latter has strong implications for the 
appropriate method for introducing business training to a program or market, since the impact is 
highest on those who indicate the lowest demand for the service (i.e., charging a fee for the 
business training initially may yield the exact wrong set of clients in order to maximize impact). 
  We find no change in loan size or cumulative savings.  The improved default and client 
retention rates have strong implications for the profitability of the institution, as discussed in 
more detail in the conclusion. 
Business skills and practices 
  In the follow-up survey we asked clients questions about key elements of the training, 
such as business knowledge, marketing strategies, use of profits, and record-keeping (see 
Appendix Table 1 for the full list of survey questions and variable definitions).  Table 2 shows 
                                                 
13 Moreover, when looking at those less interested in training, we also find a significant effect of business 
training on permanent dropouts.   16
the results on these outcome measures.  Training participants demonstrated greater business 
knowledge, answering more questions correctly (10 percentage points, which is 0.07 standard 
deviations).  The greater knowledge translated into better business practices, though only in 
limited areas.  The training increased the likelihood that individuals reinvested profits in their 
business by four percentage points (0.08 standard deviations), maintained sales records for their 
business by between three percentage points (0.07 standard deviations), and maintained 
withdrawal records from their business by seven percentage points (0.17 standard deviations).  
Lastly, individuals were asked to name changes or innovations they have made to their 
businesses over the prior year, and those in the treatment group were five percentage points 
more likely to report having done so.
14   
  Table 2b shows that impacts on business formality and on the execution of changes for the 
business were observed mostly on the clients who expressed low interest in training in the 
baseline survey.  This result is consistent with those in Table 1b, reinforcing the notion that the 
benefits of the program concentrated in those that did not foresee them at the start.
15  However, 
several other results (reinvesting profits in their business, improvements in business knowledge, 
and maintaining sales records) show stronger impacts on those with higher  expressions of 
interest.  Hence we consider the results mixed at best with regard to heterogeneous treatment 
effects for those with differing levels of prior interest in training. 
                                                 
14 Microentrepreneurs in the Ayacucho treatment groups reported higher execution rates in overall 
treatment of the client, the use of special discounts and seasonal adjustments in the products offered to 
their clientele. 
15 For the execution of changes in business practices, effects are stronger in Ayacucho, where FINCA 
clients are poorer, have less formal education and expressed less interest in the training in the baseline 
survey.    17
Business results 
  Table 3 presents the results on business outcomes such as sales and employment.  Sales in 
the month prior to the surveys were 16% higher.  When looking at the variation in sales, we find 
the largest effect for sales in a bad month, which is 28% higher among treatment groups 
compared to control groups.  We infer from this latter result that the training has helped clients 
identify strategies to reduce the fluctuations in their sales.  For instance, they could have 
diversified the goods and services they offer or have identified clients with a different 
seasonality in their purchases. 
  For retail business, no change in profit margin was observed on the most common product 
sold.  Due to the limited time available for the survey we only asked about profit margin for the 
main product.  However, unless the profit margin shrunk on other products despite not 
decreasing on the main product, the increased overall revenue implies an increase in profits.  For 
service businesses, since no change in labor was observed, the increased revenue should 
translate more or less directly to increased profits. 
Household outcomes 
  Table 4 reports the results on household outcomes.  We divide the household outcomes 
into two categories, empowerment in decision-making and child labor.  We detect no impact on 
household decision-making such as how to use the FINCA loan and savings, whether to take 
money or products from the business, or family size decisions.  Participants are also no more 
likely to keep track of household bills or separate their money from that of their husband or 
partner.  One explanation for the lack of empowerment effects may be that we are working with 
women that already run a business, keep savings and manage loans so that they are already   18
empowered enough for the business training to have an effect on the indicators analyzed here.  
Also, as indicated in section II, FINCA clients routinely receive empowering messages during 
their bank meetings. 
  On child labor, although the overall effect is not significant for both male and female 
children, we do find a positive treatment effect on the number of hours female children dedicate 
on average to school and schoolwork.  We do not see a corresponding shift downward in hours 
spent working in the enterprise or housework, which indicates that the female children spent less 
time in leisure.  This also implies that the training had its effect not through changing the 
marginal product of labor in the enterprise, nor through an income effect, but instead perhaps 
through increasing the mother’s preference for education for their daughters.  We also find, in 
Table 4c, that for more educated mothers, the training reduces the number of hours the children 
spend working in the enterprise.  However, the corresponding increase in education is positive 
but not statistically significant. 
VI.  Conclusion 
  We raised a fundamental question, can successful entrepreneurship be taught?  In our 
setting, the answer is yes, we can teach individuals to engage in certain good business practices, 
which lead to increased sales.  Clients report engaging in some of the exact activities being 
taught in the program: separate money between business and household, reinvest profits in the 
business, maintain records of sales and expenses, and think proactively about new markets and 
opportunities for profits.  The implementation of these strategies seemed to have helped clients 
increased business income, mainly by smoothing fluctuations between good and bad periods.  
We also find positive impacts on repayment rates and client retention for FINCA, the lender.   19
  From the institutional perspective, the intervention also succeeded.  Freedom from Hunger 
has found that the marginal cost to organizations is 6%-9% of total costs (vor der Bruegge, 
Dickey and Dunford 1999).  The marginal revenue will come from the increased client retention 
and repayment rates (no change in loan sizes was observed).  The fixed cost of managing a 
village bank is high, but the variable cost of each individual client is quite low.  The improved 
client retention rate (sixteen percent improvement in client retention) generates more increased 
revenue than the marginal cost of providing the training.  The improved client repayment is 
more difficult to estimate, since the true benefit to FINCA comes through lower enforcement 
costs (the eventual default is virtually nonexistent).  Thus, this is a profitable undertaking for 
FINCA. 
  Another important result is that we find the stronger effects for those clients who 
expressed less interest in the training in the baseline survey.  Not only are they the ones more 
likely to improve retention and repayment but also they were more likely to report having 
implemented changes to improve their businesses.  This result implies that demand-driven 
“market” solutions may in fact not be as easy as charging for the services.  It is possible that 
after a free trial, clients with low-prior demand would appreciate the value and demand the 
services.  The experimental setup and outcomes measured here do not allow us to examine this.  
One conclusion is clear, merely charging for the service would not lead to the strongest impact.   
  Although this paper has broader implications to models of growth that incorporate the 
ability to increase human capital and to models of financial and small enterprise markets for the 
poor, this is at one level an exercise in program evaluation.  We suggest, however, that it is a 
necessary exercise.  Given the plethora of these projects, and given the importance of human 
capital to our thinking about growth and development, it is imperative that we know whether   20
these efforts are having a positive effect on the poor.  Having found an encouraging positive 
answer in our setting, further experimentation is now needed to verify the replicability in 
different contexts.  It also would be important to evaluate the ongoing sustainability of the 
improvements for the client and the lending institution.  Lastly, an open debate exists regarding 
alternative delivery processes, such as whether credit officers rather than training specialists 
should be delivering the education.     21
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Graph 1. Distribution of the individual attendance in Ayacucho, by kind of treatment 
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a/ Individual attendance is calculated as the number of classes that the client was exposed to during her tenure in the 
treatment bank, adjusted by percentage of classes attended. 
 
 
 
Graph 2. Distribution of the individual attendance in Lima 
a/ 
 
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
0 5 10 15 20
Treatment: Number of adjusted classes  23
 
Table 1. Impact of training on institutional outcomes 
OLS, Probit 
Dependent variable
 a/ 
Mean & S.D. 
of dependent 
variable 
Nº of 
clients 
Treatment 
impact 
without 
covariates 
Treatment 
impact with 
covariates
 e/ 
Loan size 
b/  212.19  3170  2.35  8.75 
 (207.73)    (13.692)  (12.911) 
Cumulative savings 
b/  304.45  3170  -11.53  -4.37 
 (411.31)    (15.839)  (16.027) 
Repayment 
c/  0.80  3170  0.03  0.03* 
 (0.40)    (0.022)  (0.020) 
Fines 
c/ d/ 0.03  2785  0.10  0.12 
 (3.20)    (0.130)  (0.133) 
Solidarity discounts 
c/  d/ 0.44  2785  -0.22  -0.19 
 (5.71)    (0.435)  (0.403) 
Dropout 
c/        
Permanent or Temporary Dropout  0.61  3170  -0.04  -0.05* 
 (0.49)    (0.026)  (0.026) 
Permanent Dropout  0.45  3170  -0.02  -0.03 
 (0.50)    (0.025)  (0.026) 
Each coefficient reported in the table is from a separate regression.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%.  Standard errors clustered by village bank in parentheses.  Marginal effects 
reported for probit specifications (repayment, client retention, and all dropout variables). 
 
a/ Dependent variables are defined as follows.  Loan size: Amount borrowed from FINCA's external 
account at beginning of loan cycle (US$).  Cumulative savings: Balance at end of loan cycle (US$).  
Repayment: Binary variable equal to one if, since the beginning of training, the client made all her 
payments on time or had sufficient savings to cover missed payments. Fines: Amount discounted from the 
savings account for not attending or being late to any of the meeting, and/or not making the weekly 
installment (US$).  Solidarity discounts: Discounts from savings account that occur when there is an 
individual default in the external account not covered by defaulter’s individual savings (US$).  Permanent 
or Temporary Dropout: Binary variable equal to one if client had left a FINCA village bank ever after the 
beginning of the training.  Permanent Dropout: Binary variable equal to one if client had left a FINCA 
village bank by December 2005. 
b/ Double difference estimate reported. 
c/ First difference estimate reported. 
d/ Only available in FINCA database since June 2004. 
e/ The covariates include location (Ayacucho or Lima), business activity, business size, age, schooling and 
number of FINCA loans received by the client.   24
Table 1b. Impact of training on institutional outcomes, by sub-group 
OLS, Probit 
 Location 
Type of Treatment   
(Ayacucho only)    
Ex-ante Attitude 
Towards Training  Education  Civil Status  Business Size 
 
Mean & 
S.D. of 
dependent 
variable  Ayacucho Lima Mandatory  Voluntary Low 
interest 
High 
interest 
Below 
high 
school 
Above 
high 
school 
Single Married Below 
median
Above 
median 
Dependent variable
 a/ (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
Loan size 
b/  212.19 2.68  40.04  13.67 -12.23  17.20  -13.02  8.48 -24.71  -19.25  9.61 -7.96 13.21 
  (207.73) (11.886)  (30.918)  (14.215)  (13.603)  (14.324)  (19.001) (13.990)  (28.568) (22.767)  (14.724) (14.119) (18.605) 
Cumulative savings 
b/   304.45 -15.09 3.60  4.30  -36.12  -11.14  -12.17 -9.65  -22.24  38.38  -27.70*  -25.03  0.82 
  (411.31) (22.490)  (16.096)  (25.566)  (27.218)  (21.362)  (25.347) (16.038)  (47.374) (37.173)  (16.876) (18.666) (24.382) 
Repayment 
c/   0.80 0.04  0.01  0.05*  0.08***  0.06**  0.00 0.04*  0.01  0.01  0.04  0.02  0.04* 
  (0.40) (0.025)  (0.043)  (0.027) (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.026) (0.023)  (0.039)  (0.031)  (0.024)  (0.027)  (0.026) 
Fines 
c/  0.03 0.03  0.26  0.02 0.24*  0.16  0.03  0.11 0.13  0.24  0.06  -0.07  0.25 
  (3.20) (0.128)  (0.315)  (0.149) (0.136)  (0.140)  (0.229) (0.131)  (0.394)  (0.248)  (0.148)  (0.153)  (0.193) 
Solidarity discounts 
c/   0.44 0.01  -0.76  0.01  0.01  -0.44  0.03  -0.29 0.13  -0.49  -0.14  0.26 -0.62 
  (5.71) (0.007)  (1.442)  (0.012) (0.009)  (0.637)  (0.272) (0.524)  (0.276)  (0.584)  (0.395)  (0.206)  (0.844) 
Dropout 
c/                          
Permanent or 
Temporary   0.61 -0.05*  -0.01  -0.12***  -0.07*  -0.08***  0.01  -0.03 -0.07  -0.07  -0.03  -0.01  -0.06** 
  (0.49) (0.031)  (0.047)  (0.037) (0.039)  (0.031)  (0.035) (0.029)  (0.048)  (0.044)  (0.027)  (0.032)  (0.033) 
Permanent  0.45 -0.05*  0.03  -0.06* -0.03  -0.06**  0.01  -0.02 -0.06  -0.04  -0.02  -0.01 -0.04 
  (0.50) (0.030)  (0.047)  (0.035) (0.032)  (0.029)  (0.034) (0.027)  (0.048)  (0.042)  (0.027)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
Each coefficient reported in the table is from a separate regression.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Standard errors clustered by 
village bank in parentheses.  Marginal effects reported for probit specifications (repayment, client retention, and all dropout variables). 
 
b/ Double difference estimate reported. 
c/ First difference estimate reported. 
d/ Only available in FINCA database since June 2004. 
e/ The covariates include location (Ayacucho or Lima), business activity, business size, age, schooling and number of FINCA loans received by the client. 
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Table 2. Impact of training on business practices 
OLS, Probit 
Dependent variable
 a/ 
Mean & S.D. 
of dependent 
variable 
Nº of 
clients 
Treatment 
impact without 
covariates 
Treatment 
impact with 
covariates
 h/ 
Tax formality
 b/ 0.14  3398  0.01    0.01 
 (0.35)    (0.012)    (0.011) 
Profit used for business growth 
c/ 0.67  3427  0.04**    0.04** 
 (0.47)    (0.020)    (0.019) 
Thinking of keeping business safe when taking 
money from it  
c/ 0.26  3427  -0.002    -0.0002 
 (0.44)    (0.016)    (0.015) 
Fixed salary
 b/ 0.04  3424  -0.02    -0.02 
 (0.20)    (0.017)    (0.017) 
Keeping records of:           
Sales
 b/ 0.29  3388  0.03*    0.04* 
 (0.45)    (0.020)    (0.021) 
Withdrawals
 b/ d/ 0.11  969  0.07*    0.07* 
 (0.31)    (0.042)    (0.043) 
Payments to workers
 c/  0.23 2992  0.005    0.004 
  (0.57)   (0.015)    (0.013) 
Business knowledge index
 c/ 3.32  3427  0.10*    0.08 
   (1.40)    (0.060)    (0.055) 
Started new business
 c/ 0.14  3427  -0.02    -0.02 
 (0.35)    (0.012)    (0.012) 
Number of sales locations 
b/ 1.07  3424  0.01    0.01 
 (0.32)    (0.026)    (0.026) 
Level of diversification           
Number of income sources
 b/ e/ 2.33  2394  -0.02    -0.02 
 (0.53)    (0.038)    (0.038) 
Importance of main product 
c/ f/ 2.31  2221  0.01    0.01 
 (0.70)    (0.034)    (0.035) 
Allows sales on credit 
b/ 0.59  3424  -0.002    -0.002 
 (0.49)    (0.015)    (0.015) 
Proportion of clients who faced problems with 
business
  c/ g/ 0.65  1033  0.02    0.02 
 (0.48)    (0.034)    (0.034) 
Proportion of clients who: 
c/          
Planned innovations in their businesses  0.65  3427  0.02    0.03 
 (0.48)    (0.019)    (0.018) 
Executed innovations in their businesses 0.39  3427  0.05**    0.05** 
 (0.49)      (0.020)    (0.019)   
Each coefficient reported in the table is from a separate regression.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.  Standard errors clustered by village bank in parentheses. Marginal effects reported for probit 
specifications (tax formality, profit used for business growth, thinking of keeping business safe when taking money from 
it  fixed salary, keeping records, started new business, allowing sales on credit and proportion of clients who faced 
problems/planned innovations/executed innovations). 
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a/ Dependent variables are defined as follows.  Tax Formality: Binary variable equal to one if client has a tax ID number. 
Profit used for business growth: Binary variable equal to one if client reported re-investing profits for the growth or 
continuity of the business. Thinking of keeping business safe when taking money from it: Binary variable equal to one if 
client considers the needs of the business when taking money from the business for family use.  Fixed salary: Binary 
variable equal to one if client pays herself a fixed salary.  Keeping records: Binary variable equal to one if client records 
sales/withdrawals/payments to workers in a registry or notebook.  Business knowledge index: Number of right answers 
given by the client when asked about what should be done to increase business sales and to plan for a new business.  
Started new business: Binary variable equal to one if client reports that she began a new business in the last year 
(Ayacucho) or the last two years (Lima).  Number of sales locations: Number of locations where the client sells her main 
business’s products.  Number of income sources: Number of income sources the client reports (personal/family 
businesses, other jobs or working activities, etc).  Importance of the main product: Discrete variable indicating if the sales 
of the most profitable product represent 1) all; 2) more than half; or 3) less than half of business sales.  Allows sales on 
credit: Binary variable equal to one if client makes sales on credit.  Proportion of clients who faced problems with 
business: Binary variable equal to one if client reports that her business faced a specific problem in the last year 
(Ayacucho) or the last two years (Lima).  Proportion of clients who planned/ executed innovations in their businesses: 
Binary variable equal to one if client had an idea for /implemented a change or innovation to improve the business 
(Ayacucho) or to solve the problems faced (Lima).  
b/ Double difference estimate reported. 
c/ First difference estimate reported. 
d/ Only for Lima 
e/ Only for Ayacucho. 
f/ Scale from 1 to 3. The higher, the more diversified. 
g/ Only in Lima. This outcome can be divided between business and family/health related problems. 
h/ The covariates include location (Ayacucho or Lima), business activity, business size, age, schooling and number of 
FINCA loans received by the client. 
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Table 2b. Impact of training on business practices, by sub-group 
OLS, Probit 
 
Location  Type of Treatment   
(Ayacucho only) 
Ex-ante Attitude 
Towards Training  Education  Civil Status  Business Size 
  
Mean & 
S.D. of 
dependent 
variable  Ayacucho Lima Mandatory  Voluntary  Low 
interest 
High 
interest 
Below 
high 
school 
Above 
high 
school 
Single Married Below 
median 
Above 
median 
Dependent variable
 a/  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
Tax formality
 b/  0.14 0.02  -0.02  0.01 0.03*  0.03**  -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01 
  (0.35) (0.014)  (0.021)  (0.015) (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.017) (0.012) (0.032) (0.026) (0.013) (0.013)  (0.021) 
Profit used for business 
growth 
c/  0.67  0.04 0.03 0.03  0.06* 0.02  0.06***  0.04* 0.02 0.06 0.03* 0.03  0.06** 
  (0.47) (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.028) (0.030)  (0.027)  (0.024) (0.022) (0.035) (0.040) (0.021) (0.027)  (0.025) 
Thinking of keeping 
business safe when taking 
money from it 
c/  0.26 -0.01  0.01  -0.02  -0.0004  -0.02  0.02  0.001 -0.003 -0.01  0.002 -0.003  -0.0002 
  (0.44) (0.017)  (0.031)  (0.019) (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.022) (0.017) (0.032) (0.032) (0.017) (0.020)  (0.022) 
Fixed salary
 b/  0.04 0.01  0.002  0.01 0.002  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02 -0.03  * -0.01  -0.02  -0.01 -0.03 
  (0.20) (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.018) (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.024) (0.022) (0.015) (0.034) (0.018) (0.022)  (0.019) 
Keeping records of:                    
Sales
 b/  0.29 0.04  0.04  0.03 0.05  0.01  0.06** 0.04*  0.05  0.08  0.02  0.04  0.03 
  (0.45) (0.024)  (0.039)  (0.026) (0.034)  (0.024)  (0.031) (0.022) (0.050) (0.048) (0.021) (0.027)  (0.033) 
Withdrawals
 b/   0.11        0.04  0.09  0.06 0.13 0.16 0.05  0.15**  0.01 
  (0.31)         (0.066)  (0.056)  (0.048)  (0.120) (0.125) (0.046) (0.072)  (0.045) 
Payments to workers
 c/  0.23 0.004  0.005  0.01  -0.02  0.02  -0.01  0.01 -0.02  -0.01 0.01  -0.001  0.01 
  (0.57) (0.018)  (0.030)  (0.020) (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.022) (0.014) (0.039) (0.029) (0.018) (0.016)  (0.024) 
Business knowledge index
 c/  3.32 0.08  0.16  0.10 0.11  0.02  0.20***  0.11* -0.002 0.09  0.11*  0.02  0.20*** 
  (1.40) (0.076)  (0.094)  (0.065) (0.091)  (0.071)  (0.074) (0.061) (0.110) (0.117) (0.063) (0.074)  (0.076) 
Started new business
 c/  0.14 -0.01  -0.02  -0.02 -0.01  -0.02  -0.02 -0.02* 0.01  -0.02 -0.01 -0.03*  0.001 
   (0.35) (0.012)  (0.030)  (0.013) (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.018) (0.013) (0.028) (0.026) (0.014) (0.016)  (0.018)   28
 
Table 2b. Impact of training on business practices, by sub-group (Continued) 
OLS, Probit 
 Location  Type of Treatment   
(Ayacucho only) 
Ex-ante Attitude 
Towards Training  Education  Civil Status  Business Size 
 
Mean & 
S.D. of 
dependent 
variable  Ayacucho Lima Mandatory  Voluntary Low 
interest 
High 
interest 
Below 
high 
school 
Above 
high 
school 
Single Married Below 
median 
Above 
median 
Dependent variable
 a/  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
Number of sales locations 
b/  1.07 0.03  0.05  0.04  0.01  -0.01  0.03  0.004 0.02 -0.03  0.02 -0.01 0.03 
  (0.32) (0.023)  (0.053)  (0.027) (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.039) (0.027) (0.054) (0.042)  (0.029) (0.037) (0.028) 
Level of diversification                          
Number of income  
sources
  b/  2.33     -0.02  -0.03  -0.02  -0.01  -0.03 0.002 0.05  -0.0001  0.01 -0.06 
  (0.53)     (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.066)  (0.041) (0.090)  (0.075)  (0.070)  (0.050)  (0.057) 
Importance of main  
product 
c/   2.31 -0.01  0.03 0.02  -0.05  0.03  -0.02 0.01 0.005 0.04  -0.001  0.01  0.0002 
  (0.70) (0.045)  (0.052)  (0.035) (0.054)  (0.047)  (0.047) (0.037) (0.062) (0.069)  (0.037) (0.045) (0.045) 
Allows sales on credit 
b/  0.59 0.002  0.004  0.005 -0.001  0.02  -0.02  0.002 -0.02 -0.02  0.004  -0.01 0.01 
  (0.49) (0.019)  (0.023)  (0.020) (0.021)  (0.017)  (0.021) (0.016) (0.027) (0.025)  (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) 
Proportion of clients who 
faced problems with 
business
 c/  0.65         0.07  -0.01  0.06  -0.14** 0.12*  -0.01  0.04  -0.01 
  (0.48)         (0.051)  (0.043)  (0.038)  (0.061) (0.075) (0.035) (0.045) (0.049) 
Proportion of clients who: 
c/                          
   Planned business  
   innovations  0.65 0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02 0.02  -0.02  0.03*  -0.0005  0.05** 
  (0.48) (0.021)  (0.036)  (0.023) (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.026) (0.023) (0.036) (0.040)  (0.021) (0.027) (0.022) 
   Executed business  
   innovations   0.39  0.07***  0.01  0.06**  0.07** 0.06*** 0.03 0.06** 0.02  0.05  0.05** 0.03 0.07** 
  (0.49) (0.024)  (0.034)  (0.026) (0.032)  (0.023)  (0.028) (0.023) (0.036) (0.037)  (0.022) (0.025) (0.027) 
Each coefficient reported in the table is from a separate regression.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Standard errors clustered by village bank in 
parentheses.  Marginal effects reported for probit specifications (tax formality, profit used for business growth, thinking of keeping business safe when taking money from it  fixed 
salary, keeping records, started new business, allowing sales on credit and proportion of clients who faced problems/planned innovations/executed innovations). For linear 
specifications, we report  X 2 1 β β + from eq. (2) for FD estimates, and  X 4 2 β β + from eq. (4) for DD estimates.  
a/ All dependent variables are defined identically to those in the previous table. See notes under Table 2 for variable definitions.  
b/ Double difference estimate reported 
c/ First difference estimate reported   29
 
Table 3. Impact of training on business results 
OLS 
Dependent variable
 a/ 
Mean & S.D. of 
dependent 
variable 
Nº of 
clients 
Treatment impact 
without covariates 
Treatment impact 
with covariates
 d/ 
Sales 
b/            
Last month  (log)   6.56  3421  0.16  *  0.16  * 
 (1.63)    (0.082)    (0.082)   
Good month  7.91  3389  -0.01    0.00   
 (1.26)    (0.051)    (0.051)   
Normal month  7.15  3388  0.10  **  0.11  ** 
 (1.20)    (0.052)    (0.052)   
Bad month  5.91  3381  0.28  ***  0.28  ***
 (2.24)    (0.100)    (0.100)   
Difference good-bad month  2.00  3380  -0.28  ***  -0.28  ***
 (2.02)    (0.103)    (0.103)   
Weekly surplus from most profitable 
product 
c/  11.87 1759  1.84   1.71   
 (46.34)    (2.275)    (2.139)   
Number of workers 
b/            
Total   1.96  3398  -0.01    -0.01   
 (1.46)    (0.063)    (0.063)   
Paid workers, not family members  0.25  3396  -0.05    -0.06   
   (1.05)     (0.044)     (0.043)    
Each coefficient reported in the table is from a separate regression.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.  Standard errors clustered by village bank in parentheses.  
 
a/ Dependent variables are defined as follows. Last week sales: Logarithm of main business’s sales in the month 
preceding each survey.  Good/ Normal/ Bad sales: Logarithm of main business’s sales in a good/normal/bad month.  
Difference good-bad week: Difference in monthly sales between good and bad month.  Weekly surplus from most 
profitable product: Difference between the weekly revenue and cost of the most profitable product in the main business 
(soles). Number of total workers: Number of workers in the main business. Number of paid workers: Number of 
workers in the main business that are not household members. 
b/ Double difference estimate reported. 
c/ First difference estimate reported. 
d/ The covariates include location (Ayacucho or Lima), business activity, business size, age, schooling and number of 
FINCA loans received by the client. 
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Table 3b. Impact of training on business results, by sub-group 
OLS 
 
Location  Type of Treatment   
(Ayacucho only) 
Ex-ante Attitude 
Towards Training  Education  Civil Status  Business Size 
  
Mean & 
S.D. of 
dependent 
variable  Ayacucho Lima Mandatory  Voluntary Low 
interest 
High 
interest 
Below 
high 
school 
Above 
high 
school 
Single Married Below 
median 
Above 
median 
Dependent variable
 a/ (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Sales 
b/                    
Last month (log)   6.56 0.07  0.11  0.06 0.09  0.16  0.15 0.13  0.28* 0.24 0.13  0.22**  0.10 
  (1.63) (0.083)  (0.116)  (0.090)  (0.105)  (0.099)  (0.110) (0.088) (0.151) (0.147) (0.089) (0.111) (0.078) 
Good month  7.91 0.03  -0.02  0.04 0.01  -0.01  0.00  -0.03 0.07  0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 
  (1.26) (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.07) (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) 
Normal month  7.15 0.08  0.12  0.06 0.11  0.08  0.13* 0.10*  0.13  0.11  0.10*  0.12  0.10 
  (1.20) (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.07) (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.07) (0.05) (0.11) (0.10) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) 
Bad month  5.91 0.21*  0.15 0.17  0.28**  0.27**  0.30** 0.26** 0.35** 0.38** 0.26** 0.36**  0.21* 
  (2.24) (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.14) (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13) (0.11) (0.18) (0.18) (0.11) (0.14) (0.12) 
Difference good-
bad month  2.00 -0.18  -0.15**  -0.13  -0.27**  -0.26**  -0.30** -0.28**  -0.28  -0.34*  -0.26**  -0.37***  -0.18 
  (2.02) (0.11)  (0.07)  (0.14) (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.12) (0.11) (0.17) (0.18) (0.11) (0.14) (0.13) 
Profit from most 
profitable product 
c/  11.87 0.72 3.06 1.38  3.20  1.56  2.04  0.63 5.69 -1.64 2.72 0.61 2.89 
  (46.34) (2.20) (4.10) (2.46)  (3.68)  (2.06)  (3.90) (2.38) (5.88) (1.79) (2.78) (1.81) (4.03) 
Number of workers 
b/                    
Total   1.96 -0.02  -0.02  0.04 -0.11  0.02  -0.05 0.01 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 0.08 -0.10 
  (1.46) (0.071)  (0.118)  (0.080)  (0.096)  (0.086)  (0.092) (0.071) (0.151) (0.119) (0.076) (0.078) (0.104) 
Paid workers, not  
family members  0.25 -0.05  -0.04  0.00  -0.12**  -0.05  -0.05 -0.07 0.00  -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 
  (1.05) (0.039)  (0.096)  (0.046)  (0.053)  (0.059)  (0.066) (0.043) (0.131) (0.072) (0.053) (0.055) (0.075) 
Each coefficient reported in the table is from a separate regression.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Standard errors clustered by village bank in 
parentheses. For linear specifications, we report  X 2 1 β β + from eq. (2) for FD estimates, and  X 4 2 β β + from eq. (4) for DD estimates. 
a/ All dependent variables are defined identically to the previous table. See notes under Table 3 for variable definitions.  
b/ Double difference estimate reported. 
c/ First difference estimate reported.   31
 
Table 4. Impact of training on household outcomes 
OLS, Probit 
Dependent variable
  a/ 
Mean & S.D. 
of dependent 
variable 
Nº of 
clients 
Treatment 
impact without 
covariates 
Treatment 
impact with 
covariates
 e/ 
Client’s decision power on
 b/        
Loans/savings from FINCA for hh/business (index)
  0.01 3422 -0.07  -0.08 
  (1.24)  (0.064)  (0.062) 
Number of children  4.04 2782  0.02  0.02 
  (0.81)  (0.047)  (0.046) 
Taking money/products from business
  4.76  3356  0.0004  0.003 
 (0.72)    (0.037)  (0.036) 
Keeping track of household bills
 b/ 3.50  3416  -0.02  -0.03 
 (1.60)    (0.076)  (0.075) 
No need to separate money
 c/ 0.62  3413  -0.01  -0.01 
 (0.49)    (0.019)  (0.019) 
Child Labor
 d/        
     Working children  0.31  1043  -0.02  -0.01 
 (0.46)    (0.035) (0.035) 
     Daily hours dedicated to         
          House work  1.02  1043  0.01  0.004 
 (0.85)    (0.059)  (0.059) 
          Child labor  0.59  1043  -0.05  -0.05 
 (1.10)    (0.079)  (0.080) 
          Schooling       7.35  1040  0.10  0.09 
 (1.48)    (0.108)  (0.108) 
     Children with perfect attendance  0.97  1025  0.01  0.01 
 (0.18)    (0.013) (0.012) 
Each coefficient reported in the table is from a separate regression.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.  Standard errors clustered by village bank in parentheses.  Marginal effects reported for probit 
specifications (no need to separate money, working children and children with perfect attendance). 
 
a/ Dependent variables are defined as follows. Client’s decision power: Index aggregating the responses to questions on 
who makes key decisions on household and business finance, the number of children to have, and the amount of 
money/products taken from the business; a higher number is associated with greater decision making power for the client.  
Keeping track of household bills: A categorical variable indicating who is in charge of paying household bills; a higher 
number is associated with more responsibility for the client.  No need to separate money: Binary variable equal to one if 
client thinks that is not necessary to separate her money from that of her husband/partner or other adult in the household 
to control expenses and savings.  Working children: Binary variable equal to one if the child works.  Daily hours 
dedicated: Number of hours the child dedicated to each activity in the week before the survey; schooling includes the time 
the child spent at school, as well as the time he/she dedicates to do homework or study at the household.  Children with 
perfect attendance: Binary variable equal to one if the child attended school all the days that he/she could have. 
b/ Double difference estimate reported. 
c/ First differences. 
d/ Sample for the analysis on child labor includes school-aged children (between 6 and 15 years of age) of clients in Lima. 
e/ The covariates include location (Ayacucho or Lima), business activity, business size, age, schooling and number of 
FINCA loans received by the client.   32
Table 4b. Impact of training on household outcomes, by sub-group 
OLS, Probit 
 
Location  Type of Treatment   
(Ayacucho only) 
Ex-ante Attitude 
Towards Training  Education  Civil Status  Business Size 
  
Mean & 
S.D. of 
dependent 
variable  Ayacucho Lima Mandatory  Voluntary  Low 
interest 
High 
interest 
Below 
high 
school 
Above 
high 
school 
Single Married Below 
median 
Above 
median 
Dependent variable
 a/ (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
Client's decision power on
 b/                          
Loans/savings from  
FINCA for hh/business
   0.01 -0.04  -0.08  -0.02 -0.08  -0.11  -0.03 -0.08 -0.06 -0.17 -0.05  0.02 -0.18* 
  (1.24) (0.078)  (0.113)  (0.090)  (0.102)  (0.087)  (0.094) (0.072) (0.137)  (0.132) (0.072) (0.087) (0.093) 
Number of children  4.04 0.03  0.06  0.01 0.06  -0.02  0.07  0.04 -0.04 0.10 0.01 -0.04 0.09 
  (0.81) (0.058)  (0.079)  (0.067)  (0.075)  (0.065)  (0.066) (0.053) (0.094)  (0.110) (0.051) (0.065) (0.067) 
Taking money/products  
from business
   4.76 -0.03  0.01  -0.06 0.02  -0.002  0.001 0.02 -0.07  -0.04 0.01 -0.001  0.0003 
  (0.72) (0.045)  (0.067)  (0.047)  (0.053)  (0.050)  (0.055) (0.041) (0.081)  (0.077) (0.042) (0.051) (0.053) 
Keeping track of household 
bills
 b/  3.50 -0.03  -0.04  -0.04 -0.01  -0.03  -0.02 0.01 -0.17  0.002  -0.03 0.03 -0.08 
  (1.60) (0.093)  (0.135)  (0.104)  (0.117)  (0.104)  (0.112) (0.086) (0.163)  (0.159) (0.087) (0.105) (0.111) 
No need to separate money
 c/  0.62 -0.02  0.01  -0.02 -0.03  0.02  -0.05*  -0.004 -0.04  0.05  -0.03  0.02 -0.05  * 
  (0.49) (0.023)  (0.035)  (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.027) (0.022) (0.037)  (0.033) (0.022) (0.025) (0.029) 
Each coefficient reported in the table is from a separate regression.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Standard errors clustered by village bank in 
parentheses.  Marginal effects reported for probit specifications (no need to separate money). For linear specifications, we report  X 2 1 β β + from eq. (2) for FD estimates, and 
X 4 2 β β + from eq. (4) for DD estimates. 
a/ All dependent variables are defined identically to the previous table. See notes under Table 4 for variable definitions.  
b/ Double difference estimate reported. 
c/ First differences. 
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Table 4c. Impact of training on child labor, by sub-group 
OLS, Probit 
 Child’s  gender 
Mother’s Ex-ante Attitude 
Towards Training  Mother’s Education  Mother’s Civil Status 
  
Mean & 
S.D. of 
dependent 
variable  Female Male 
Low 
interest 
High 
interest 
Below 
high 
school 
Above 
high 
school Single  Married 
Dependent variable
 a//b/  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
     Working children  0.31  -0.07  0.03  -0.01  -0.02  0.01  -0.09  -0.13  0.01 
  (0.46)  (0.047) (0.044) (0.057)  (0.044) (0.041) (0.068) (0.087) (0.038) 
     Daily hours dedicated to                   
          House work  1.02  -0.09  0.08  0.08  -0.03  0.01  -0.02  -0.13  0.03 
  (0.85)  (0.091) (0.071) (0.096)  (0.075) (0.069) (0.119) (0.152) (0.065) 
          Child labor  0.59  -0.15  0.03  0.11  -0.14  0.04  -0.32**  -0.24  -0.02 
  (1.10)  (0.111) (0.101) (0.131)  (0.099) (0.093) (0.156) (0.224) (0.085) 
          Schooling       7.35  0.25 *  -0.04  -0.06  0.18  0.08  0.12  0.12  0.10 
  (1.48)  (0.146) (0.135) (0.171)  (0.138) (0.125) (0.214) (0.236) (0.120) 
Children with perfect attendance  0.97  -0.01  0.03  -0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  -0.05  0.02 
  (0.18)  (0.012) (0.020) (0.016)  (0.018) (0.014) (0.033) (0.030) (0.014) 
Each coefficient reported in the table is from a separate regression.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Standard errors clustered by 
village bank in parentheses.  Marginal effects reported for probit specifications (working children and children with perfect attendance). For linear specifications, we 
report  X 2 1 β β + from eq. (2) for FD estimates, and  X 4 2 β β + from eq. (4) for DD estimates. 
a/ All dependent variables are defined identically to the variables in Table 4.  See notes under Table 4 for variable definitions.  
b/ Sample for the analysis on child labor includes school-aged children (between 6 and 15 years of age) of clients in Lima.   34
Appendix Table 1: Descriptions of outcome variables 
Variable  Description Time  of  measurement 
1. Institutional outcomes 
Loan size  Amount borrowed from FINCA's external account at beginning of loan cycle (US$).  Last cycle before and last 
available after the training
Cumulative savings  Savings balance (voluntary and mandatory) at end of loan cycle.  Last cycle before and last 
available after the training
Repayment  Binary variable equal to one if, since the beginning of training, the client made all her payments 
on time or had sufficient savings to cover missed payments 
Every cycle since the 
beginning of training 
Fines  Amount discounted from the savings account for not attending or being late to any of the meeting, 
and/or not making the weekly installment (US$).   
Solidarity discount  Discounts from savings accounts that occur when there is an individual default in the external 
account not covered by defaulter’s individual savings (US$).   
Dropout, global  Binary variable equal to one if client had left a FINCA village bank ever after the beginning of 
the training.   
Dropout, permanent  Binary variable equal to one if client had left a FINCA village bank by December 2005.   
Dropout with default  Binary variable equal to one if client defaulted by the time she left the village bank.   
Dropout without default  Binary variable equal to one if client did not defaulted by the time she left the village bank.   
2. Business results 
Last month’s sales (log)  Logarithm of sales from the client’s main business in the month preceding each survey.  BL and FU 
Good sales  Sales from the client’s main business in a good month (S/.).  BL and FU 
Normal sales  Sales from the client’s main business in a normal month (S/.).  BL and FU 
Bad sales  Sales from the client’s main business in a bad month (S/.).  BL and FU 
Difference good-bad monthly sales  Difference between sales from the client’s main business in a good month and in a bad month 
(S/.)  BL and FU 
Weekly surplus from most profitable 
product 
Difference between the weekly revenue and cost of the most profitable product in the main 
business (S/.)  FU 
Number of total workers  Number of workers in the main business.  BL and FU 
Paid workers, not family  Number of workers in the main business that are not household members.  BL and FU 
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3. Business practices 
Tax formality  Binary variable equal to one if the client has a tax ID number.  BL and FU 
Profits used for business growth  Binary variable equal to one if the client reported re-investing profits for the growth or continuity 
of the business.  FU 
Thinking of keeping business safe 
when taking money from it 
Binary variable equal to one if client considers the needs of the business when taking money from 
the business for family use.  FU 
Fixed salary for herself  Binary variable equal to one if the client pays herself a fixed salary.  BL and FU 
Records sales  Binary variable equal to one if the client records her sales in a registry or notebook.  BL and FU 
Records withdrawals  Binary variable equal to one if the client records her cash and in-kind withdrawals in a registry or 
notebook.  BL and FU 
Records wages  Binary variable equal to one if the client records in a registry or notebook the wage payments she 
makes to workers that are not household members.  FU 
Business knowledge  Number of right answers given by the client when asked about what should be done to increase 
business sales and to plan for a new business.  FU 
Starting a new business  Binary variable equal to one if the client reports having begun a new business in the last year 
(Ayacucho) or the last two years (Lima).  FU 
Number of sales locations  Number of locations where the client sells the products of her main business.  BL and FU 
Number of income sources   Number of income sources the client reports. Includes all her personal/family businesses as well 
as other jobs or working activities (only available for Ayacucho).  BL and FU 
Importance of main product 
Discrete variable that indicates if the sales of the most profitable product represent 1) all business 
sales; 2) more than half of business sales; or 3) less than half of business sales. The higher the 
number, the more diversified the business is. 
FU 
Allows credit sales  Binary variable equal to one if the client makes sales on credit.  FU, but recalling situation 
12 months before survey 
Faced problems with business  Binary variable equal to one if the client reported that her business faced a specific problem in the 
last year (Ayacucho) or the last two years (Lima).  FU 
Planned change/innovation  Binary variable equal to one if the client had an idea for a change/innovation to improve the 
business (Ayacucho) or to solve the problems faced (Lima).  FU 
Implemented change/innovation  Binary variable equal to one if the client implemented a change/innovation to improve the 
business (Ayacucho) or to solve the problems faced (Lima).  FU   36
4. Empowerment outcomes 
Financial decisions 
Index aggregating the answers to questions on who makes decisions on savings and credit for the 
household and the business. For each specific question, a categorical variable is generated and a 
higher number means more decision making power on the part of the client. Index was 
constructed using principal component analysis for discrete/categorical data. 
BL and FU 
Family size decisions  Variable indicating power in making decisions regarding family size. Uses same categories as 
above.  BL and FU 
Keeping track of household bills  Variable that indicates who is in charge of ensuring that the household bills have been paid. Uses 
same categories as above.  BL and FU 
Taking money/product from business Variable that indicates who decides to take products/money from the business. Uses same 
categories as above.  BL and FU 
Need to separate money  Binary variable equal to one if the client needs to separate her money from that of her 
husband/partner or other adult in the household to control expenses and savings.  FU  
5. Child labor outcomes 
Working children  Binary variable equal to one if the child works.    
Hours dedicated to house work/child 
labor/schooling 
Number of hours the child dedicated to each activity in the week before the survey; schooling 
includes the time the child spent at school, as well as the time he/she dedicates to do homework or 
study at the household.   
 
Children with perfect attendance  Binary variable equal to one if the child attended school all the days that he/she could have.  
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Appendix Table 2: Descriptive statistics of outcome variables 
Variable   Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Institutional results                
Loan size  6340  253.22  264.59  50.00  4,500.00 
Cumulative savings  6340  299.56  405.41  -1,742.62  5,492.73 
Repayment 6340  0.80  0.40  0.00  1.00 
Fines 2721  0.02  3.23  -62.00  32.00 
Solidarity discounts  2721  0.34  4.07  0.00  142.43 
Dropout global  6340  0.61  0.49  0.00  1.00 
Dropout permanent  6340  0.45  0.50  0.00  1.00 
Global dropout with default  6340  0.16  0.37  0.00  1.00 
Global dropout without default  6340  0.42  0.49  0.00  1.00 
Permanent dropout with default  6340  0.14  0.35  0.00  1.00 
Permanent dropout without default  6340  0.30  0.46  0.00  1.00 
Business practices         
Tax formality  6471  0.15  0.35  0.00  1.00 
Profit used for business growth  3473  0.67  0.47  0.00  1.00 
Thinking of keeping business safe when taking money from it  3473  0.26  0.44  0.00  1.00 
Fixed salary  6331  0.09  0.28  0.00  1.00 
Keeping records of sales  6381  0.34  0.47  0.00  1.00 
Keeping records of withdrawals  5393  0.20  0.54  0.00  3.00 
Keeping records of payments to workers  1704  0.21  0.40  0.00  1.00 
Business knowledge index  6946  3.32  1.40  0.00  13.00 
Started new business  6946  0.07  0.26  0.00  1.00 
Number of sales locations  6946  1.05  0.46  0.00  4.00 
Number of income sources  4820  1.89  0.79  0.00  5.00 
Importance of main product  2255  2.31  0.70  1.00  3.00 
Allows sales on credit  6946  0.58  0.49  0.00  1.00 
Proportion of clients who faced problems with business  2126  0.32  0.47  0.00  1.00 
Proportion of clients who planned innovations in their businesses  6946  0.32  0.47  0.00  1.00 
Proportion of clients who executed innovations in their businesses  6946  0.20  0.40  0.00  1.00 
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Appendix Table 2: Descriptive statistics of outcome variables (Continued) 
Business results         
Last month sales (log)   6451  6.77  1.66  0.00  14.47 
Good month sales  6353  7.95  1.29  3.04  14.69 
Normal month sales  6341  7.19  1.21  2.40  14.47 
Bad month sales  6303  6.10  2.04  0.00  13.77 
Difference good-bad month sales  6297  1.85  1.76  -1.67  12.95 
Weekly surplus from most profitable product  1799  -550.45  13,753.86  -336,994.60  1,000.00 
Total number of workers  6453  1.18  3.98  0.00  198.00 
Number of paid workers, not family members  6456  0.48  4.55  0.00  99.00 
Household outcomes         
Client’s decision power on:           
Loans/savings from FINCA for hh/business (index)
   6731  -0.04  1.27 -4.66 1.33 
Number of children  4588  4.06  0.77  1.00  5.00 
Taking money/products from business
  6186  4.74  0.71  1.00  5.00 
Keeping track of household bills  6865  3.45  1.54  1.00  5.00 
No need to separate money  3459  0.62  0.49  0.00  1.00 
Child labor         
Working children  1043  0.31  0.46  0.00  1.00 
Daily hours dedicated to:           
House work  1043  1.02  0.85  0.00  5.00 
Child labor  1043  0.59  1.10  0.00  8.00 
Schooling       1040  7.35  1.48  0.00  13.00 
Children with perfect attendance  1025  0.97  0.18  0.00  1.00   39
 
Appendix Table 3: Ex-ante differences between clients by location and permanence in FINCA 
 Treatment  Control  Difference  T-stat   
Response rate (follow-up survey)  75.2  77.9  -2.7  2.060  ** 
By Location           
Lima   77.2  83.5  -6.2  2.845  ***
Ayacucho 74.5  74.8  -0.3  0.170   
By Permanence in FINCA           
Clients 83.2  83.9  -0.6  0.339   
Ex-clients 69.9  74.2  -4.3  2.436  ***
Tenure in FINCA (Cycles)                
Lima 5.2  5.2  0.0  0.030   
Ayacucho 6.0  5.8  -0.2  -1.220   
Years of Education           
Lima 9.9  9.7  0.2  0.946   
Ayacucho 8.1  8.1  0.0  0.009   
Age          
Lima 42.6  42.3  0.3  0.529   
Ayacucho 36.3  36.5  -0.2  -0.510   
Loan Size (external account)
a/ b/          
Lima 293  308  15  1.09   
Ayacucho 173  167  -6  -0.85   
Accumulated Savings 
a/ b/          
Lima 174.9  185.2  -10.3  -0.703   
Ayacucho 360.4  348.6  11.7  0.577   
Default Rate 
b/          
Lima 0.03  0.03  0.00  0.109   
Ayacucho 0.02      0.01  0.00  0.369   
Drop out Rate 
b/          
Lima 22.5  23.3  -0.8  -0.37   
Ayacucho 22.8  23.4  -0.6  -0.47   
Last week sales (log)         
Lima 7.4  7.4  0.0  -0.071   
Ayacucho 6.3  6.3  0.0  -0.086   
Number of total workers            
Lima 1.2  1.2  0.0  -0.202   
Ayacucho 0.8  0.8  0.0  0.793   
Number of paid workers            
Lima 0.4  0.3  0.1  0.894   
Ayacucho 0.2  0.2  0.0  0.442   
Ex-ante high interest in training           
Lima 0.6  0.6  0.0  0.446   
Ayacucho 0.4  0.4  0.0  0.797    
Source: FINCA-Peru historical database and baseline client survey. 
Averages were calculated for the cycle before the BDS training program was started. 
a/ In US $. 
b/ In the last cycle before the beginning of training. 
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Appendix Table 4: Post intervention differences for dropout reasons, Ayacucho & Lima 
  Total   Treatment     Control   
  # obs  %    # obs  %    # obs  %    Difference T-stat   
Number of clients  3457      2093  60.54    1364  39.46          
   5-I. Reasons related with the policies and procedures of the FINCA program                    
Dissatisfied with FINCA's loan terms  227  6.57    131  6.26    94  6.89    -0.633  -0.737   
Dissatisfied with FINCA's saving terms  51  1.48    28  1.34    23  1.69    -0.348  -0.830   
Dissatisfied with the solidarity discounts (only Lima) 
a/ 47  4.42    20  3.68    27  5.19    -1.509  -1.196   
The meetings were too long or too far  (interference with business' schedule 
and/or personal activities)  404 11.69    256  12.23    145 10.63    1.601  1.437  * 
Unequal / bad treatment to bank members  142  4.11    82  3.92    59  4.33    -0.408  -0.592   
Because of the training  0  0.00   0  0.00   0  0.00  0.000  -   
FINCA discovered loans from other institutions (only Ayacucho)  
b/  13 0.54    7 0.45    6 0.71    -0.259  -0.825   
Found an institution with better loan terms  18  0.52    11  0.53    7  0.51    0.012  0.049   
   5-II. Reasons related with the group loans                    
The village bank “graduated” (or was dissolved) 30  0.87    14  0.67    13  0.95    -0.284  -0.928   
Personal conflicts in the bank (with other bank members or with the bank's 
president )  170 4.92    106  5.06    63 4.62    0.446 0.594   
   5-III. Reasons related to the client’s business                    
No credit needs because of the good situation of the business (sufficient capital 
in the business or the business operates seasonally)  29 0.84    18  0.86    11 0.81    0.054 0.169   
No credit needs/could not pay the loan because of the bad situation of the 
business or other reasons  304 8.79    187  8.93    116 8.50    0.430 0.437   
Closed the business / new activity or job   69  2.00    38  1.82    30  2.20    -0.384  -0.794   
   5-IV. Personal Reasons                    
Expenses resulting from a family crisis (i.e. illness) or family event (i.e. 
wedding)  312 9.03    193  9.22    118 8.65    0.570 0.573   
Other  personal  problems  124 3.59    74 3.54    50 3.67    -0.130  -0.201   
Left the region/went on a long trip   215  6.22    140  6.69    75  5.50    1.190  1.417  * 
A relative influenced the client  37  1.07    23  1.10    14  1.03    0.073  0.202   
   5-V. Reasons due to Environmental Factors                    
Environmental / macroeconomic factors   57  1.65    31  1.48    26  1.91    -0.425  -0.959   
   5-VI. Other Reasons                    
Other / Did not respond  221  6.39    134  6.40    85  6.23    0.171  0.201    
a/ There are 1063 observations: (543 received treatment)  
b/ There are 2394 observations: (1550 received treatment) 
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Appendix A: Business Training Materials 
 
In Lima, the training was administered as a two-part program.
1  Module 1, “Training 
for Success,” consists of 15 sessions that introduce the topics of business administration 
and marketing.  Classes begin by introducing attendees to what a business is, how a 
business works, and the marketplace.  Women are taught to identify their customers, 
business competitors, and the position of the business in the marketplace.  Later in the 
module, sessions cover topics on product, price, and promotional strategies and a 
commercial plan.  The module also includes review sessions and a business game that 
participants play in several sessions.   
The second module, “Business and Family: Costs and Finances,” consists of 10 
sessions that explain how to separate business and home finances.  The classes cover the 
differences between income, costs, and profit, how to calculate production costs, and 
product pricing.  Other sessions cover maintaining records of business’ operations, business 
growth, loan repayment, and taxes.   
Every session of these two modules included worksheets on the topics taught for the 
clients to practice and review at the meetings or at home. 
In Ayacucho, the training program was grouped into 3 modules with topics less 
advanced than those taught in Lima.
2  Sessions were presented in 30 minute classes and did 
not used worksheets as in Lima.  Module 1, “Manage Your Business Money,” begins by 
defining the differences between money for personal expenses and for the business.   
Women are taught how to calculate profits and about the use of profits for the household 
and business.  Sessions cover how to handle selling to customers on credit, how to record 
                                                 
1 Table A1 provides a list of lessons presented in modules 1 and 2 in Lima.  
2 Table A2 provides a list of lessons presented in modules 1 -3 in Ayacucho.   42
business expenses, how to prevent losses, and the importance of investing in the business.  
The module also includes a review session. 
Module 2, “Increase Your Sales”  begins by providing an overview of five key 
elements in sales: 1) customers, 2) business product or service, 3) product placement, 4) 
pricing, and 5) marketing.  Many of the following sessions are dedicated to provide women 
with practical means of applying these concepts.  The topics covered include the key 
elements of good customer relations, how to target sales to different types of customers, 
and approaches for varying the types and timing of the products that are sold in order to 
increase sales.  Participants are also taught about how to identify locations, price goods, and 
conduct activities that increase sales and profits. 
The third module, “Plan for a Better Business,” teaches members how to incorporate 
planning into their business.  Sessions begin by presenting why planning is beneficial and 
what traits characterize a successful business.  Attendees are instructed on how to solve 
business problems and how to introduce new products or changes.  Later sessions teach the 
tools needed to prepare a sales plan, calculate business and loan costs, search for new 
resources, and handle unexpected problems and opportunities. 
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Appendix A, Table 1. Business Training Sessions Presented in Lima 
Module 1: Training for Success  Module 2: The Business and the Family:  Costs 
and Finances 
Session  Title  Session Title 
1  Training for Success  1  The Business and the Family 
 
2  What is a business?  2  Income, Costs, and Profit 
 
3  How does a business work?  3  My Costs of Production and Operating 
Resources 
4  The  Market  4  How Do I Calculate the Cost of 
Production of My Product? 
5  Who are my customers?  5  Prices and Price Equilibrium 
6  Who are my competitors?  6  How to Make a Good Price Decision 
7  Review  Session  1  7  The Registers and Controls in My 
Business 
8  Business game: Module 1  8  The Growth of My Business 
9  My business’ position in the market  9  Will I Be Able to Pay My Loan? 
10  Product and Price Commercial 
Strategy 
10 Taxes 
11 Marketplace and Promotion 
Commercial Strategy 
  
12  My Commercial Plan     
13  Review Session 2     
14  Business Game: Module 2     
15  Business Game: Module 3     
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Appendix A, Table 2: Business Training Sessions Presented in Lima 
Module 1: Manage Your Business Money  Module 2: Increase Your Sales 
Session   Title  Session Title 
1  Separate Business and Personal 
Money 
1  Know Your Customers 
2  Use Business Loans for Your 
Business 
2  Treat Your Customers Well 
3  Calculating Profits  3  Sell to Different Kinds of Customers 
4  Track, Plan and Invest Your 
Business Money 
4  Improve Your Products and Services 
5  Decide How to Use the Profits of the 
Business to Satisfy the Needs of the 
Business and Your Personal Needs 
5  Sell New and Complementary Products 
and Services 
6  Prevent Business Losses  6  Seize Opportunities to Sell 
7  Manage Credit Sales  7  Sell Where Customers Buy the Most 
8  Review of the Learning Sessions of 
“Manage Your Business Money” 
8  Set the Right Price 
    9  Promote Your Business With Good 
Selling Practices 
    10  Plan for Increased Sales 
 
Module 3: Plan for a Better Business 
Session  Title 
1  Use Planning Steps to Grow Your Business 
2  Examine How Your Business Is Doing 
3  Decide How You Can Improve Your Business 
4  Develop and Test New Business Ideas 
5  Plan How Much to Make and Sell 
6  Plan Business Costs 
7  Plan for More Profit 
8  Find Resources for Your Business 
9  Prepare for Unexpected Events 
 
 
 